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Innocence and Nostalgia in Conversation Analysis: 
The Dynamic Relations of Tape and Transcript 
Malcolm Ashmore & Darren Reed∗ 
Abstract: This paper attempts an analysis of some of the 
methodological practices of Conversation Analysis (CA); in 
particular, tape recording and transcription. The paper starts 
from the observation that, in the CA literature, these prac-
tices, and the analytic objects they create (the tape and the 
transcript), are accorded different treatment: simply put, for 
CA the tape is a "realist" object, while the transcript is a 
"constructivist" one. The significance of this difference is 
explored through an analysis of the dynamics of CA prac-
tice. We argue that the "constructivist transcript" is prem-
ised on an understanding of CA as predominantly con-
cerned with maximising its "analytic utility": a concern of 
one distinct temporal stage of CA work: that of the "inno-
cent" apprehension of objects in the "first time through". 
The "realist tape", in contrast, is based on a different aspect 
of the work of CA: its quest for greater "evidential utility", 
achieved by the "nostalgic" revisiting of previously pro-
duced objects for purposes of checking them against each 
other; work done in the "next time through". We further ar-
gue that both the ontology and the epistemology of CA's ob-
jects are changed in any next time encounter. We conclude 
with a cautionary speculation on the currently-projected, 
transcript-free, digital future of CA. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine certain of the methodological practices of Conversation 
Analysis (CA). Thus, this paper joins a number of recent discussions of CA 
which are variously concerned with CA's foundational concepts (ten HAVE 
1997, LYNCH & BOGEN 1994), its relationship to ethnomethodology (CLAY-
MAN & MAYNARD 1995, LYNCH 1993, p. 203-264), the proper range of its 
empirical materials (McHOUL 1987, MOERMAN 1988, NELSON 1994), and 
with analyses of its empirical practices (ANDERSON & SHARROCK 1994, 
BOGEN 1992). All of these texts are authored by people who can and do claim 
some sort of membership in the ethnomethodological/conversation analytic com-
munity. Though our membership is much less secure, we wish the following text 
to be taken as similar in spirit to the above, i.e. as "insider critique" motivated by 
a deep agreement with the broad aims and substantial achievements of this intel-
lectual movement.  
CA is a "unique" (ten HAVE 1990) form of qualitative social research, both in 
its restricted topical orientation and its rigorous methodological procedures. CA 
is exclusively concerned with the analysis of "talk-in-interaction"; usually, but 
not always, of casual, or mundane, conversation. According to CA, this is the 
primordial stuff of social interaction: at once the most mundane and the most 
consequential of all social phenomena. As a practice, ordinary talk is not consid-
ered by its practitioners to be particularly skilled (presumably because it is so 
basic, so pervasive, so ordinary); yet CA shows it to be a precision instrument, 
wielded by maestros. Subtle, nuanced and highly sensitive; yet structured, norma-
tive and accountable; it displays "order at all points" (SACKS 1984, p. 22), yet is 
entirely improvised. Moreover, the doing of talk produces and reproduces all the 
supposedly "external" phenomena of the socio-psychological sciences: persons, 
interaction, groups, membership categories (class/gender/ethnicity), the "sense of 
social structure" and ultimately society itself (BODEN & ZIMMERMAN 1991, 
SILVERMAN 1998, HUTCHBY & WOOFFITT 1998).  
CA is done in a very specific way: starting with audio, and sometimes video, 
recordings of "naturally-occurring" verbal interactions; transcribing them in a 
manner designed to show the "hows" of talk rather than just the "whats"; and 
subsequently developing highly detailed analyses of the ethnomethods of talk. 
We are interested in this paper in how conversation analysts work with, work on, 
and work up the series of "analytic objects" produced in and as the course of their 
research. Put schematically, these objects are the Event, the Tape, the Transcript, 
the Analysis and the Article.1 How does the apparently fixed, temporal, and linear 
                                                             
1  Our analysis is largely schematic and "conceptual", rather than "empirical". This may be taken 
to be a fault by those who argue, as conversation analysts tend to do, that it is only "in the 
presence of data" (ten HAVE 1997) that sensible and relevant analyses of such matters can be 
had. While we have some sympathy for this view in general, it is problematic for a project 
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relationships between these objects change at different points of the research 
process? How does the "evidential utility" of these objects vary with respect to 
their "analytic utility"? What is the difference between seeing (say) a transcript, 
and reading it; between hearing a tape and listening to it? At what points during 
the dynamic process of research are objects encountered by the epistemic mode 
of seeing/hearing as opposed to that of reading/listening?  
In developing our understanding of these dynamic "epistemo-phenomenologi-
cal" processes, we focus on the Tape and the Transcript as mutually elaborative 
analytic objects. We examine how the practices of tape recording and transcrib-
ing are described in the CA literature, and how this literature variously formulates 
the practical and epistemic relations between the analytic objects these practices 
produce – the Tape and the Transcript. We then introduce an abstract and highly 
general "epistemo-phenomenological schema" which, when subsequently applied 
to CA, orientates our explication of the process we call the "general and eviden-
tial nostalgic dynamic", including its epistemic functions, and the varying and 
relative roles played within it by the set of analytic objects.  
Specifically we reveal the relative reification of analytic objects such that the 
original phenomenon, the tape, the transcript (and the analysis) are actively con-
strued differently depending on whether the object is apprehended in a state of 
"innocence" or "nostalgia". This is pursued through a "first time through" and 
"next time through" trope.  
2. The Realist Tape and the Constructivist Transcript 
The first thing to notice is that taping as an activity receives much less explicit 
discussion than does transcribing. While transcription (in CA and other forms of 
research on talk) has been the specific topic of at least one edited volume (ED-
WARDS & LAMPERT 1993), several research articles (OCHS 1979, JEFFER-
SON 1985, PACK 1986, COOK 1990, PSATHAS & ANDERSON 1990, 
MISHLER 1991, O'CONNELL & KOWAL 1994, JEFFERSON 1996, GREEN, 
GRANQUIZ & DIXON 1997), and is routinely and extensively discussed in 
recent CA introductory textbooks (PSATHAS 1995, HUTCHBY & WOOFFITT 
1998, SILVERMAN 1998, ten HAVE 1999), recording has received less atten-
tion. This is not, however, because the Tape is considered less important; indeed, 
in many ways, as we shall detail, it appears to carry more weight than does the 
Transcript.  
                                                                                                                                
which, among other ambitions, wishes to address the question of what counts as data, when it 
so counts, and for whom does it so count. 
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2.1 Taping 
When the practice of recording is discussed, what is addressed tends to be its 
technical aspects (GOODWIN 1994, ten HAVE 1999, Ch. 4, MODAFF & MO-
DAFF 2000).2 Moreover, most discussions concentrate on the relatively novel 
technology of video recording. A plausible reason for this neglect, is that audio 
recording (and its results) has become so culturally naturalised, that, like photog-
raphy, it is extremely difficult to problematise, to loosen the hold of its stubborn 
realism (cf. MISHLER 1991, pp. 255-259). Though many, perhaps most, (West-
ern) children have had the vertiginous experience of hearing and not recognising 
the sound of their own recorded voice, the "doubt" that this experience potentially 
raises is quickly reframed as normal and explicable.  
2.2 The tape 
A typical statement of the importance of the Tape in CA is from POMERANTZ 
and FEHR (1997, p. 70): "Conversation analysts strongly prefer to work from 
recordings of conduct". The reason given for this preference is four-fold:  
1) "certain features of the details of actions in interaction are not recoverable in 
any other way" 
2) "a recording makes it possible to play and replay the interaction, which is 
important both for transcribing and for developing an analysis." 
3) "a recording makes it possible to check a particular analysis against the 
materials, in all their detail, that were used to produce the analysis." 
4) "a recording makes it possible to return to an interaction with new analytic 
interests." (1997, p. 70)  
Notice first that these remarks address the tape as a "found object": they are con-
cerned with what can be done with a recording, not with the activity of recording 
itself. The origin of the Tape – its relation to any particular Event – is not of 
specific interest. This lack of interest in the process of recording (whether as a 
technical or conceptual issue) is an important first step in the "naturalising" of the 
Tape. In effect it provides for the "forgetting" of the Event, and its wholesale 
replacement by the Tape.  
The first desideratum attends to the technical necessity for this replacement. 
Neither the Event-in-itself nor any other procedure for its "reconstruction" – 
ethnographic observation, memories, post hoc inquiries, intuitive invention – is 
                                                             
2  An exception is LOMAX and CASEY's (1998) non-CA reflexive analysis of the constructive 
and constitutive effects of video recording. They argue, and we agree, that "the activity of data 
collection is constitutive of the very interaction which is then subsequently available for inves-
tigation" (1998, abstract). This is not a view for which it is easy to find support in the CA lit-
erature. 
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adequate. The second reason introduces the idea of "replayability": the Tape, as 
opposed to the Event, can be encountered more than once; it can be re-heard, can 
be subject to repeated listening. Reasons three and four specify uses for the 
Tape's replayable character: the Tape can be used as the standard against which 
the Analysis can be checked; and it can be revisited to produce a new Analysis, 
i.e. the Tape can be the source of more than one series of analytic objects.  
2.3 Transcription 
"[I]t is a truism to note that all transcription is in some sense interpretation …" 
(COOK 1990, p. 12)  
"A first observation is that there is not, and cannot be, a 'neutral' transcription 
system." (PSATHAS & ANDERSON 1990, p. 75)  
"[A] transcript is a text that 're'-presents an event; it is not the event itself. Fol-
lowing this logic, what is re-presented is data constructed by a researcher for a 
particular purpose, not just talk written down." (GREEN et al. 1997, p. 172)  
"Transcription as theory" (OCHS 1979, Title)  
These statements are typical of the "sophisticated" understanding of transcription 
in CA and other work on discourse. It is routinely understood as a craft process, 
as itself a part of the practice of analysis, as conventional and constructive. De-
bates about "how much" to transcribe (O'CONNELL & KOWAL 1994), or about 
the consequential features of particular systems and designs (HOPPER 1989, 
EDWARDS & LAMPERT 1993) are commonplace. Students (and other re-
searchers; see GREEN et al. 1997) are regularly warned not to fetishize the tran-
script, nor to treat it as the data, as we shall shortly see.  
Of course, we are very far from objecting to this approach to transcription. 
What we are interested in is the contrast, in CA, between this "constructivist" 
approach to transcription and the "realist" approach to recording and the tape. As 
we will detail below, this contrast is itself consequential for the practices of CA, 
and particularly for how the mutually elaborative relation between the transcript 
and the tape is understood.  
2.4 What counts as data: The mutual elaboration of  
tape and transcript 
There are various formulations of the roles of tape and transcript in CA, some of 
which are set out in the following five quotations. They are ordered in an array 
from the most to the least "transcript-friendly".  
"Audio recordings, while faithfully recording what the machine's technology al-
lows to be recorded, are not immediately available, in a sense. The details that 
the machine records have to be remarked by the listening analyst and later made 
available to the analyst's audience. It is the activity of transcribing the tapes that 
provides for this, that captures the data, so to speak." (HAVE 1999, p. 6)  
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"The best way to develop analyses is to use both a tape and a transcript. It is 
harder to isolate and study phenomena when working only with a tape, and 
much information is lost when working only with a transcript. Also, without 
hearing/seeing the tape from which a transcript was derived, one cannot know 
how much confidence to have in a transcript." (POMERANTZ & FEHR 1997, 
p. 70-71)  
"The transcription of data is a procedure at the core of analysis … It is important 
to stress that, for CA, transcripts are not thought of as 'the data'. The data consist 
of tape recordings of naturally occurring interactions … Given this conception 
of the data, the aim in CA is not simply to transcribe the talk and then discard 
the tape in favour of the transcript ... Conversation analysts … do not analyse 
transcripts alone: rather, they aim to analyse the data (the recorded interaction) 
using the transcript as a convenient tool of reference. The transcript is seen as a 
'representation' of the data; while the tape itself is viewed as a 'reproduction' of a 
determinate social event." (HUTCHBY & WOOFFITT 1998, pp. 73-74)  
"… any claim made about the interaction is answerable, not to a transcript, but 
in the final analysis to the recording" (WILSON 1999)  
"… from bitter personal experience I have learned never to trust a mere tran-
script too much. The time is soon approaching when transcripts (at least in the 
traditional sense) will seem far too crude for our analytic purposes – a hopeless 
attempt to fix on paper what is, in its deepest sense, dynamic." (CARROLL 
2000)  
These five quotations encapsulate rather different understandings of the relative 
place of tape and transcript in CA, which of the two should be given more 
weight, and which should count as "the data". The first quote from ten HAVE 
expresses some doubt about what we will be calling the "analytic utility" of the 
tape. It cannot be used on its own: it is not "immediately available"; it has to be 
"remarked" (transcribed); and it is this transcription process that "captures the 
data". Here, then, it is the transcript which is the more valuable of the two ob-
jects. POMERANTZ and FEHR put forward a "middle ground" position in which 
both objects are equally valuable and should be used in conjunction with one 
another. Like ten HAVE, they note the tape's relative lack of analytic utility, but 
they also point to the transcript's inability to engender "confidence": in our terms, 
its relative lack of "evidential utility". The third quote from HUTCHBY and 
WOOFFITT shifts the objects' relative value in favour of the tape. While ac-
knowledging the importance of transcription as a "procedure at the core of analy-
sis", the thrust of their remarks is an insistence on the superiority of the tape. The 
tape has this greater status because it embodies the data "(the recorded interac-
tion)" whereas the transcript is merely "a convenient tool of reference".3 These 
valuations are neatly encapsulated in HUTCHBY and WOOFFITT's final onto-
logical distinction between the tape as "reproduction" and the transcript as "repre-
                                                             
3  PSATHAS & ANDERSON concur: "It should be noted … that the status of the transcript 
remains that of 'merely' being a representation of the actual interaction – i.e., it is not the inter-
action and it is not the 'data'" (1990, p.77). 
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sentation". The fourth contribution from WILSON attends succinctly to what 
accounts for the superiority of the tape. The tape is a better "spokesperson" for 
analytic claims than the transcript: the evidential buck of "answerability" stops at 
the tape. Finally, CARROLL projects a desired (digital) future when the "mere 
transcript" can be abandoned entirely in favour of analyses that work directly on 
and from recordings. For CARROLL the transcript is both too untrustworthy and 
too "crude": it not only lacks evidential utility (as noticed by POMERANTZ & 
FEHR and by WILSON), its analytic utility is also in doubt.  
What we want to argue here is that the disparity between these versions of the 
mutual relations of tape and transcript can be accounted for by recognising a 
corresponding distinction in the "phase" or "stage" of the CA research process 
that these authors implicitly are addressing. A positive evaluation of the transcript 
(as most clearly evidenced by ten HAVE) corresponds to a dominant concern 
with what we will call the stage of First Time Through, while those accounts that 
find the transcript wanting (especially WILSON & CARROLL) are more con-
cerned with the later stage of Next Time Through. Another way to put this is that 
the value of the transcript makes itself felt most clearly in the business of building 
the series of analytic objects that make up the "material" of any CA research 
project and thus in the search for analytic utility. On the other hand, when the 
tape appears as the "better" object of the two, what is being alluded to is its value 
in strengthening the evidential utility of the already-produced objects.  
Before we can fully explain these concepts we must first acquaint you with 
our "General Epistemo-Phenomenological Schema" (see also Figure 1) which 
provides the essential, if inelegantly-titled, framework for our discussion. 
3. The General Epistemo-Phenomenological Schema 
We are describing here a kind of dynamic continuum, whose poles are mythic: on 
the left, we have "reality", or the "natural attitude", and on the right, "fiction", or 
the "mediated attitude".4 These are the pure, and impossible, states in which there 
is no admixture of the other. On the left, a "state of nature", apprehended instinc-
tively by totally embedded "members" devoid of intentionality and sense-making 
ability. On the right, a "state of mind", in which all actions are self-started by 
radically self-conscious agents with no direct, nor even mediated, relation to an 
external world.  
                                                             
4  SCHUTZ (1972) and GARFINKEL (1967) use the term "scientific attitude" here. We prefer 
"mediated" as this term can account for all activities of formulation, understanding, representa-
tion, performance, whether done in the course of scientific work or not. 
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Figure 1: The General Epistemo-Phenomenological Schema 
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In between these poles is our world; and perhaps any conceivable world.5 Let 
us map out some of the relations we see obtaining in this space. First, note that it 
is divided diagonally into two phenomenological areas: "Life", which dominates 
the left hand side, and "Work", which governs the right. "Life" labels a phenome-
nology of Being; "Work", one of Becoming. Movement along the horizontal 
plane (which is also a timeline; see below) reduces the influence of one while 
correspondingly increasing that of the other.  
Second, there are two corresponding epistemologies, or modes of world-en-
countering, that are, relatively, more leftward or rightward leaning. Hearing/ 
seeing is leftward leaning while listening/reading tends toward the right. Hearing 
and seeing have in common a certain automatic quality: routine yet spontaneous, 
as if called up by the apprehended object as a response to a stimulus. They are the 
unreflective modes of the natural attitude, our unremarkable ethnomethods for 
living our lives. The knowledge required to hear and to see is a-theoretic: a mat-
ter of "knowing how" rather than "knowing that". The effect on the world of 
engaging in such activities is minimal: the world stays much as it was.  
When encountered through the right hand side epistemic modes of listening 
and reading, the world is interpreted rather than apprehended, and represented 
instead of simply responded to. Rightward leaning epistemic activities, then, are 
forms of productive work. Engaging in them results in the addition of new objects 
to the world – objects that, as representations or interpretations, change what the 
world is taken to be. Note, however, that we are not dealing directly here with the 
products themselves (talk, texts, images, etc.) nor with their "modes of produc-
tion" (speaking, writing, imaging…). We are limiting ourselves to an examina-
tion of what, in vocabularies we do not wish to buy into, might be called "re-
sponses" or "receptive behaviours".6  
There is a kind of exchange of qualities in play too. As we move rightwards or 
leftwards we suffer losses yet achieve compensating gains. Moving right entails a 
loss of "original detail": of the complexity and richness of "the world as it is" in 
all its "blooming, buzzing confusion". In compensation, rightward-tending epis-
temic activities add their own products, their own "novel detail"; which, the fur-
ther to the right one moves, themselves gain in richness and complexity. And as 
the reverse movement is made, so the opposite exchange takes place.  
Finally, the left-to-right dimension marks a temporal ordering, on many con-
ceivable scales (species time; a lifetime; even, as we shall see in the next section, 
the temporality of conversation analytic research). Movement from the left to the 
right involves a change from a "pre" time to a "post" time. However, this timeline 
                                                             
5  Though a kind of left-hand world is sometimes said to have existed in the past and/or in 
simpler societies; a nostalgia for this "world we have lost" can be seen to have animated cer-
tain founding sociological contrasts such as TOENNIES' Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. Sim-
ilarly, we are sometimes said to be entering a form of the right-hand world, such as BAU-
DRILLARD's postmodern dystopia of inauthentic simulacra. 
6  We have sketched an account of the "machinic-productive processes" of CA elsewhere (REED 
& ASHMORE 2000). 
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is not a one way street. Shifts from the right to the left, from the "post" to the 
"pre", can occur. Our name for what may occasion such shifts is the "nostalgia 
dynamic". By this, we mean to indicate that desire, regularly felt (and encoun-
tered in others), born, perhaps, of a SARTREan mauvais fois, for greater simplic-
ity, authenticity, and directness, after what (is deemed to be, at this juncture) a 
surfeit of sophistication and irony, an overdose of ramified interpretations; sim-
ply, just too much rightward-ness. On a larger and more exalted scale, this kind 
of nostalgia motivates that ever-popular social scientific classic, "The Critique of 
(Post) Modernity". In Figure 1, we have marked the operation of this dynamic as 
producing a single shift all the way back from the Fiction mythline to the Reality 
mythline. However, smaller leftward movements from any point along the time-
line are possible; indeed, more common.  
4. The General Schema Applied to CA 
We now move from the abstractions of the general schema to its concrete appli-
cation in the case of CA. Note, to begin with, that in Figure 2 we have inserted 
the five analytic objects used/produced in CA – Event, Tape, Transcript, Analy-
sis, Article – ordered from left to right.7 Obviously, this is a temporal order of 
production; but it is more than that as we shall see. Second, the phenomenologi-
cal division of the general schema, with "Life" at the left and "Work" at the right, 
has been augmented with, respectively, "Evidential Utility" and "Analytic Util-
ity". A further change is a specification of (some of) the ways that the "nostalgia 
dynamic" operates in CA, motivating, for example, a shift "back" from Transcript 
to Tape. Finally, we have labelled the left-hand mythline (which marks off the 
impossible "reality" pole of the continuum), as, additionally, a "modal-line" 
marking the shift in modality from the Event to its recording as the Tape; and 
added a second which marks the modal shift from the Tape to the Transcript, 
Analysis and Article. The first of these shifts is the more radical: crossing the 
modal-line from Event to Tape is permanent; there is no going back. Indeed the 
Event is, in relation to the practices and objects of CA, effectively mythic; as its 
position to the left of the mythline suggests. The second modal shift – from the 
aural to the textual – is less irreversible, but it still has significant consequences.  
 
                                                             
7  We limit ourselves here to the objects in play in any single piece of CA research. Further 
analytic objects (including text books, reviews, critiques, bibliographies, web sites, email lists, 
courses, conferences…) constitute CA as a discipline, a culture and a literature. 
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Figure 2: The General Schema Applied to CA 
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When we say that the left-right ordering of the analytic objects is more than 
simply a temporal one, we mean that as each object is produced, one after the 
other, changes of a phenomenological and epistemic character occur too. For 
example, while the Event is full of Life, it does not present itself successfully as 
an object suitable for Work. It has, in its state of brute Being, minimal Analytic 
Utility. On the other hand, the Event possesses a great deal of Evidential Utility. 
That is, by pointing to the Event as the natural origin of its endeavours, CA can 
claim an evidential grounding in the real. (CA is neither fiction nor "merely in-
terpretation" because it is "about" real interaction, done by real people in real 
settings in real time, as evidenced by the Event.) Note, however, that this pointing 
is both post hoc and other-directed: it can only occur after the production of 
other, "later", analytic objects; and it is useful mainly as a rhetorical device to 
justify CA to non-members.8 We have said that analytic work cannot be easily 
done on the Event-as-such. In fact the only Work generated by the Event is that 
of its radical transformation into something other than itself through the process 
of recording and the production of the Tape.  
The reason the Event is so unsuitable for analytic purposes, is that it is appre-
hendable only transiently, in the course of its flow, and only "from within". As a 
part of the scene, and by a member of the setting (who may of course be a re-
searcher), an Event can be, in our terms, seen and heard. But it cannot be read 
nor listened to.  
With each move to a new analytic object further to the right, the level of "ori-
ginal detail" is reduced and replaced by a corresponding level of "novel detail". 
Though in the move from Event to Tape, much of the lived complexity of the 
former is erased, something new takes its place: the Tape introduces novelties 
that were not there in the "original"; chief among these being "replayability". At 
the other end of our scale, the shift from Analysis to Article involves a loss of 
some of the complexity (and certainly a lot of the detail) of a specific analytic 
exercise, yet compensates for this by the addition of new connections and the 
refinement of the overall network of conversation analytic results.  
4.1 Nostalgia dynamics 
The various backward shifts diagrammed in Figure 2 (from Article to Analysis, 
from Analysis to Tape, etc.) can be understood to be doubly motivated. First, 
there is the operation of the general nostalgia dynamic, prompting returns to 
earlier, and thus more "actual", more "lifelike", stages of the analytical process. 
What is sought for, in effect, is the recovery of some level of "original detail". 
Closely connected is the desire to revisit the past for purposes of strengthening 
the evidential adequacy of the analysis, by checking (say) the Analysis against 
                                                             
8  However, it may be used too for self-justification and encouragement: "If I didn't think that 
CA was about understanding reality, there would be no point in doing it" (paraphrase of per-
sonal communication: Charles ANTAKI to Malcolm ASHMORE, August 2000). 
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the Transcript, or the Transcript against the Tape. In each backwards shift moti-
vated in this way, the "earlier" object is treated as (relatively) fixed with respect 
to the "later". Indeed, on such occasions, the former acts as an unquestioned 
standard with which to assess the fidelity of its translation into the latter. On these 
occasions, then, the leftward analytic object is reified. That it is possible to treat 
objects in this way, however, is the result, we will argue, of how they are treated 
(worked on and worked up) at the stage of the research process we call First Time 
Through.  
4.2 Reverse checking: Doubting the tape 
But before we advance this argument, we will deal briefly with an apparent ex-
ception to our claim that it is the earlier, leftward, object that is reified in the 
activities of evidential checking we have been describing.  
In one of the few articles we have found which address the activity of audio 
recording (MODAFF & MODAFF 2000) we find an example of evidential 
checking in which an object to the right is used to check one to its left. At one 
point in their paper, MODAFF and MODAFF discuss the differential quality of 
recordings of each party's contribution to telephone conversations depending on 
the location of the recording device:  
 
 
 
As these fragments are (of course) transcripts, the work MODAFF and MO-
DAFF's reader has to do in order to find "louder and more predominant" re-
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cordings of Jay in fragment 1A and of Dee in fragment 1B, is one of seeing, 
immediately and imaginatively translated into hearing. Thus, in 1A (Jay's), line 
001, we see Jay doing "uh::m (.)", whereas in 1B (Dee's), line 001, we see Jay 
doing "uh:: (0.2)". With our instructions to see/hear Jay as "clearer" in 1A than in 
1B, we can duly do so by finding both additional detail (the "m") and greater 
refinement (the micropause "(.)"). Similarly, we can find a superior Dee in 1B. 
The weak and imprecise hearing of "(yeah)" in 1A, line 003, can be seen, in 
Dee's 1B (line 002, "=Okay") to be seeably/hearably more accurate in three 
distinct ways. First, the hearing is disambiguated, as visually evidenced by the 
absence of parentheses; consequently, we know that "yeah" is an artefact, and 
therefore, that "Okay" is not. Second, then, we know that Dee said "Okay". And 
finally, we see that its correct sequential placing is at the beginning of line 002, as 
an utterance latched to the end of Jay's turn on line 001; the addition of the latch-
ing symbols ("=" "=") acting as our visual evidence for this third form of in-
creased accuracy.9  
So what we have here is a rare example of the Transcript being used as the 
standard with which to check the Tape. This "reverse checking" is explicable in 
that the only object "to the left" of the Tape is the Event; and, being mythic, the 
Event is unavailable for this kind of work. Moreover (however "merely techni-
cal" it may be – MODAFF and MODAFF's treatment being entirely within the 
frame of technical adequacy) the examination of recording as a practice disturbs 
the unproblematic treatment of the Tape as immutable "data". Suddenly, the Tape 
is as "insecure" and "untrustworthy" as all the other, more obviously crafted, 
objects. And also, of course, the Transcript in such a procedure takes on the 
qualities of immutability more frequently attributed, in CA, to the Tape. The 
contingencies of its production have to be erased, just as the local histories of 
particular recordings routinely are in CA's rhetoric of method, so as to enable the 
Tape to act as the data: the object to which claims about the interaction are "in the 
final analysis" (WILSON 1999) answerable.  
                                                             
9  Actually, though, there is a problem here. The technical aim of this comparative exercise is to 
recommend the use of doubled recordings of telephone conversations (MODAFF & MO-
DAFF 2000, p. 111). But an even closer comparative analysis of the lines we have just been 
looking at suggests that having two recordings may produce radical kinds of undecidability. 
Note that in fragment 1A (better for Jay), line 002, Jay continues his line 001 turn with "and". 
However, as we have seen, Dee's version (1B) has the first syllable of Dee's latched utterance 
"Ok[ay]" at this precise point. So what is being done here? Jay's "and"? Dee's "Ok"? Or, per-
haps, both, overlapped? And how could this be decided? 
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5. Innocence and Nostalgia: 
First Time, and Next Time, Through 
We wish to argue that the mode of epistemic apprehension of CA's analytic ob-
jects (whether aurally accessible objects are heard or listened to, and textual ones, 
seen or read) varies systematically with reference to the temporal "stage" of the 
research. We conceive of these stages in terms of "innocence" and "nostalgia". 
When the objects are encountered for the first time ("First Time Through"; cf. 
GARFINKEL, LYNCH & LIVINGSTON 1981) they are subjected to activities 
done in the name of the rightward-leaning epistemic of listening/reading. This 
frame of innocence is a one time process – it cannot be repeated – motivated by 
the move to greater analytic utility. However, when they are apprehended subse-
quently ("Next Time Through") they are treated according to the leftward epis-
temic of hearing/seeing. Next Time encounterings, in our terms, are accom-
plished through the workings of the nostalgia dynamic, as moves to gain 
evidential utility.  
Let us unpack and elaborate this rather opaque formulation, using the Tape as 
our example (see Figure 3). A recording of a piece of talk has been made 
(whether audio or video is immaterial to our analysis). A conversation analyst 
coming to it for the first time will use the tape to make another analytic object: 
the Transcript.10 This is accomplished through listening to the tape. Note that 
there is no Transcript there already; in fact (of course) there are as yet no analytic 
objects to the right of the Tape on our timeline: they are only projected.  
As we have noted, CA's rhetoric of method generally understands the relation-
ship of Transcript to Tape in terms of "representation" (HUTCHBY & WOOF-
FITT 1998, p. 74) or translation from one modality (aural) to another (textual). In 
order to achieve this translation as "faithfully" as possible, the Tape undergoes 
intense and focussed listening. The interpretative and productive act of listening 
changes the Tape's status from an unknown to a known, from an object that is 
radically unstable to one which is relatively fixed. Listening polices the Tape. The 
"rules for hearing" distilled from this process are articulated in and as the Tran-
script. Thus, at this stage, the Transcript appears not so much as the Tape's trans-
lation, but as its caption. In Bruno LATOUR's terms, the "coupled object" of 
Tape & Transcript, bound together as "image & caption", have begun to take on 
the character and utility of an "immutable mobile" (LATOUR 1987). As we will 
see, the immutable character of the Tape is strengthened in subsequent turns 
(Next Times) which construe it as heard rather than listened to.  
 
                                                             
10  We are ignoring here the idea, increasingly mooted these digital days, of an Analysis being 
made directly from the Tape. We do, however, address this possibility below. 
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Figure 3: Epistemic Modes: First Time Through and Next Time Through 
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5.1 First time through – Innocence 
Let us follow this First Time Through trajectory a little further to the right on 
our timeline. The analyst now has two objects: the Tape and the Transcript. To 
make the third in the sequence (the Analysis), the Transcript is subjected to in-
tense and focussed reading, with the objective of producing another set of "inter-
pretation rules"; this time, for "what there is to see" in the text of the Transcript. 
Again, these rules are written in and as the next analytic object, the Analysis, 
which, once more, acts as the caption to the Transcript's image. And to repeat, 
what is produced in this process is not just a new analytic object: the "old" one, 
the one being currently acted on interpretatively and productively (i.e. read), is 
thereby strengthened, shored up, made more immutable.11 As this reiterated proc-
ess proceeds rightwards, the result is the production of a series of new, rightward, 
objects in tandem with a set of worked-on, and thus stronger objects to the left of 
the current work site. The rightward production of analytic objects in the move 
towards greater analytic utility thus leaves in its wake a series of changed objects.  
5.2 Next time through – Nostalgia 
The work of Next Time Through typically occurs at moments of doubt or dis-
trust. For example it occurs when accounts are called into question, or when a 
transcript is "checked", "refined" or "revised". In CA "re-listening" (to the Tape) 
and "re-reading" (the Transcript) are two exemplary moments of the Next Time 
Through. On these occasions what is re-experienced, according to CA's rhetoric 
of method, is an unchanged analytic object: each return is construed as though it 
were the first time the object had been encountered, as though it were through a 
frame of innocence. This orientation ignores the reflexive effects of returning to 
an object built through the search for greater analytic utility.  
We understand re-listening and re-reading differently. Motivated by the nos-
talgia dynamic we have outlined above, the return to and re-working of analytic 
objects on a second, or subsequent – any Next Time – occasion, is not, for us, 
strictly speaking, a re- anything. Next Time work is done on a different character 
of object. The objects worked on in the First Time Through are novel and thus 
fluid and indeterminate. The actions of listening and reading make them less so, 
give them a known quality, increase their (potential) evidential utility. As we 
have argued, it is this relative strength of the "older", "left-from-here" objects that 
prompts nostalgic moves "back". The operation of the nostalgia dynamic draws 
upon this relative immutability, this relative reification of CA's analytic objects.  
                                                             
11  The process can be likened to the building of an escape tunnel, as featured in Second World 
War movies like The Great Escape and The Wooden Horse. As the tunneller (the Listener, the 
Reader) digs the formless earth, behind him the tunnel is shaped, strengthened, shored up, 
given a definitive form. 
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It is not only the character of the objects that is different in the Next Time 
Through. The mode of epistemic apprehension changes too. For example, 
returning to the Tape does not involve listening to it to find out what there is to 
be heard in it. That work has already been done and its results have been en-
shrined as and in the Transcript, as the caption to the Tape's image. But once 
the nostalgia dynamic starts to operate, objects can come "under suspicion". 
Perhaps there is "something wrong" with the Transcript. If so, we can find out 
by checking the suspect item against an (older, stronger) item to its left. So 
whereas in the First Time Through, the Transcript acted (briefly) as the warrant 
for the Tape, in the Next Time Through it is the other way round. And, as we 
have mentioned above, the activity of checking item A against item B involves 
holding B constant. In order to hold the Tape firmly in place while the Tran-
script is checked against it, it needs to be heard. Hearing, you will recall, is an 
epistemic action that leaves its object as it found it. Hearing the Tape takes for 
granted the already-known reality of "what there is to be heard".  
6. Concluding Discussion 
This "insider critique" of CA has elaborated some of the epistemic ethnomethods 
of the analytic practices found in the discipline, focussing on the mutual relations 
of tape and transcript. Our realisation of the significance of the range of positions 
on this relationship motivated our elaboration of an epistemo-phenomenological 
schema of evidential and analytic utility. By formulating the two distinct tempo-
ral processes we denote First Time and Next Time Through, we have been able to 
understand how CA's analytic objects are experienced differently relative to these 
"stages". First Time Through is engendered by the move to analytic utility, that is 
the requirement to produce worked up and work-able analytic objects. The sec-
ond activity of Next Time Through is begot by the search for increased evidential 
utility: the need to "prove" those objects' adequacy, reliability and mutual fidelity. 
And it is our contention that the majority of activity in CA is best characterised as 
Next Time Through.  
While CA's rhetoric of method includes, at times, hints of the recognition of 
the Next Time Through dynamic, it is in large part focussed on an understanding 
characterised by innocence. That is, it views its various objects "naïvely": as 
though they were unchanged on each occasion of apprehension. The trajectory of 
innocence holds only one object – the Event – genuinely immutable by rendering 
it, through its recording, forever out of reach of the researcher and the reader. 
However, as we have argued, this is not the case for CA's other analytic objects. 
When returning to the (apparently unchanged) tape and "re-listening" to it, this 
activity, being Next Time Through, reflexively formulates it, not as a listenable 
object, but as a hearable one. Similarly when a transcript is "re-read", it is formu-
lated as seeable.  
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Let us add two complications to this picture. Firstly, the hearing and seeing of 
a relatively reified analytic object is itself transient; a brief moment of "proof". To 
question what is heard or seen is to immediately render the object once more as 
produced, crafted, worked-on-and-worked-up. The evidential adequacy of any 
object is momentary, contingent and fragile.  
Secondly, on each occasion in the Next Time Through where an evidentially 
"weaker" object is checked against a "stronger", the reification of the latter is 
balanced by an equivalent "de-reification" of the former. Evidential weakness and 
strength are characteristics mutually achieved for the particular practical purpose 
at hand. Also, which object plays which role in the activity of checking one 
against the other cannot always be "read off" from CA's self-understanding. For 
CA, the Tape stands as its strongest object and, as we have shown, the studied 
lack of interest in its production and unconcern with its origin is one of the things 
that contributes to this standing. But, as we have seen in the case of MODAFF 
and MODAFF's (2000) paper on the technicalities of audio-recording, when an 
interest in the Tape's production is evidenced, it is the Transcript that is treated as 
"stronger" than the Tape.  
The idea that objects are apprehended differently in First Time and Next Time 
Through has implications for a significant plank of CA's claim to superior scien-
tificity. Harvey SACKS, the founder of CA, claimed that, in the sociology he was 
trying to develop, "the reader has as much information as the author and can 
reproduce the analysis ... I'm showing my materials and others can analyze them 
as well …" (SACKS 1995, vol.1, p. 27). MAYNARD strengthens and "scien-
tizes" this claim by noting that: "In a sense, it is possible to obtain independent 
verification of interactional patterns because those who hear or read a researcher's 
report can themselves analyze the data" (MAYNARD 1989, pp. 130-131).  
These positions are framed by an innocent, First Time Through perspective. 
The claim is that other researchers can also experience the data – whether under-
stood as Tape or Transcript – as naïve observers. They can return to the starting 
point and simply repeat the process. But, in our understanding of this projected 
task, the reader is confronted by a set of different objects than were available to 
the innocent researcher in First Time Through. In an important sense, the reader 
has much more information than the author had on the equivalent occasion: they 
have the author's analysis which instructs the reader in what to hear on the tape 
and what to see in the transcript. They are simply not in a position to approach 
the task of reanalysis with the requisite innocence.  
Alternatively, the reader of a "researcher's report" always has much less in-
formation than the author. When a written piece of analysis is presented to a 
wider audience, it is fragments of transcript that evidence the author's analytic 
claims. Should the reader wish to "go further" than these texts allow, s/he will 
have to "go back", on our nostalgic trajectory, to a more complete set of materials 
– the (whole) Transcript, the Tape – which is always somewhere else. It is this 
problem which motivates analysts like CARROLL to advocate a digital solution: 
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a transcript-free hypertext linking the Analysis directly to the Tape. It is our 
speculative view, however, that in this situation the Tape would cease success-
fully to play the role of "data": the place where the buck of "answerability" stops. 
At present the Tape's fulfilment of this role is dependent on its being "unavailable 
for questioning". Making it available for routine inspection in and as the course 
of reading CA would provoke the "invention" of a new, "stronger" analytic object 
(to its left in our schema) to which the Tape would relate, as, currently, does the 
Transcript to the Tape. In effect, the Tape would become a new form of Tran-
script.  
References 
Anderson, Robert J. & Sharrock, Wesley W. (1984). Analytic work: Aspects of 
the organization of conversational data. Journal for the Theory of Social Be-
haviour, 14 (1), 103-124. 
Boden, Deirdre & Zimmerman, Don H. (Eds.) (1991). Talk and Social Structure: 
Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Pol-
ity Press. 
Bogen, David (1992). The organization of talk. Qualitative Sociology, 15, 273-
296. 
Carroll, Donald (2000). Re: [languse] transcribing digitized recordings. Private 
e-mail message sent to Malcolm Ashmore on Sat, 27 May 2000 21:36:09 
+0900. 
Cook, Guy (1990). Transcribing infinity: Problems of context presentation. Jour-
nal of Pragmatics, 14, 1-24. 
Edwards, Jane A. & Lampert, Martin D. (Eds.) (1993). Talking Data: Transcrip-
tion and Coding in Discourse Research. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erl-
baum. 
Garfinkel, Harold (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Garfinkel, Harold & Lynch, Michael & Livingston, Eric (1981). The work of a 
discovering science construed with materials from the optically discovered pul-
sar. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11 (2), 131-158. 
Goodwin, Charles (1994). Recording human interaction in natural settings. 
Pragmatics, 3, 181-209. 
Green, Judith & Franquiz, Maria & Dixon, Carol (1997). The myth of the objec-
tive transcript: Transcribing as a situated act. TESOL Quarterly, 31, 172-176. 
Have, Paul ten (1990). Methodological issues in conversation analysis. Bulletin 
de Méthodologie Sociologique, 27 (June), 23-51 (original publication). URL: 
http://www.pscw.uva.nl/emca/mica.htm.  
Have, Paul ten (1997). In the presence of data: Conversation-analysis as "em-
pirical philosophy". Paper read at the conference on "Ethnomethodology, an 
93 
improbable sociology?", Cerisy-la-Salles, France, June 1997. URL: 
http://www.pscw.uva.nl/emca/presence.htm.  
Have, Paul ten (1999). Doing Conversation Analysis: A Practical Guide. London: 
Sage. 
Hopper, Robert (1989). Conversation analysis and social psychology as descrip-
tions of interpersonal communication. In D. Roger & P. Bull (Eds.), Conversa-
tion (pp. 48-65). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 
Hutchby, Ian & Wooffitt, Robin (1998). Conversation Analysis: Principles, 
Practices and Applications. Oxford: Polity Press (UK and Europe), Blackwell 
(USA). 
Jefferson, Gail (1985). An exercise in the transcription and analysis of laughter. 
In T. Van Dijk (Ed.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Vol. 3: Discourse and 
Dialogue (pp. 25-34). London, UK: Academic Press. 
Jefferson, Gail (1996). A case of transcriptional stereotyping. Journal of Prag-
matics, 26, 159-170. 
Latour, Bruno (1987). Science in Action. Milton Keynes: Open University Press 
(UK), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press (USA). 
Lomax, Helen & Casey, Neil (1998). Recording Social Life: Reflexivity and 
Video Methodology. Sociological Research Online, 3(2). URL: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/2/1.html.  
Lynch, Michael (1993). Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodol-
ogy and Social Studies of Science. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.  
Lynch, Michael and Bogen, David (1994). Harvey Sacks' primitive natural sci-
ence. Theory, Culture & Society, 11, 65-104. 
Maynard, Douglas W. (1989). On the ethnography and analysis of discourse in 
institutional settings. In J.A. Holstein & G. Miller (Eds), Perspectives on Social 
Problems, Vol. 1 (pp. 127-146). Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press. 
McHoul, Alec W. (1987). An initial investigation of the usability of fictional 
conversation for doing conversational analysis. Semiotica, 67, 83-104. 
Mishler, Elliot G. (1991). Representing discourse: The rhetoric of transcription. 
Journal of Narrative and Life History, 1 (4), 255-280. 
Modaff, John V. & Modaff, Daniel P. (2000). Technical notes on audio re-
cording. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 33(1), 101-118. 
Moerman, Michael (1988). Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation 
Analysis. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Nelson, Christian K. (1994). Ethnomethodological positions on the use of ethno-
graphic data in conversation analytic research. Journal of Contemporary Eth-
nography, 23, 307-329. 
Ochs, Elinor (1979). Transcription as theory. In E. Ochs & B. Schieffelin (Eds.), 
Developmental Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. 
O'Connell, D.C. & Kowal, S. (1994). Some current transcription systems for 
spoken discourse: A critical analysis. Pragmatics, 4, 81-107. 
94 
Pack, Christopher (1986). Features of signs encountered in designing a notational 
system for transcribing lectures. In H. Garfinkel (Ed.), Ethnomethodological 
Studies of Work (pp. 92-122). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Pomerantz, Anita & Fehr, B.J. (1997). Conversation analysis: An approach to the 
study of social action as sense making practices. In T.A. Van Dijk (Ed.), Dis-
course as Social Interaction. London: Sage. 
Psathas, George (1995). Conversation Analysis: The Study of Talk-in-Interaction. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage (Qualitative Research Methods 35). 
Reed, Darren & Ashmore, Malcolm (2000). The naturally-occurring chat ma-
chine. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(4). URL: http://www.api-
network.com/mc/0008/machine.html. 
Sacks, Harvey (1984). Notes on methodology. In J. Maxwell Atkinson & John 
Heritage (Eds.), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis 
(pp.21-27). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Sacks, Harvey (1995). Lectures on Conversation. 2 Vols. Edited by Gail Jeffer-
son with introductions by Emanuel A. Schegloff. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Schegloff, Emmanuel A. (1979). Identification and recognition in telephone 
conversation openings. In George Psathas (Ed.), Everyday Language: Studies 
in Ethnomethodology (pp.23-78). New York: Irvington Publishers. 
Schutz, Alfred (1972). The Phenomenology of the Social World. London: Heine-
mann. 
Silverman, David (1998). Harvey Sacks: Social Science and Conversation Analy-
sis. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Wilson, Thomas P. (1999). Re: [languse] transcribing digitised recordings. 
Posted to the "LANG-USE" (Language Use Discussion) e-mail list 
<LISTSERV@VM.TEMPLE.EDU> on Wed, 9 Jun 1999 16:50:41.  
